Introduction
While the literature on optimal monetary policy has been explored widely in the case of the traditional New Keynesian model under dierent complications 1 , there is little research in this area in the case of New Keynesian models with bounded rationality. In fact, the behavioral New Keynesian model as proposed by Gabaix (2016) departs from the traditional model by relaxing the assumption of fully rational agents. Within the new framework, agents are assumed to be partially myopic and do not anticipate the future perfectly. The features incorporated in the behavioral New Keynesian model resolve lot of unsettled questions that has been left unresolved by the traditional New Keynesian model. First, the zero lower bound when it is hit implies large depressions in the traditional model. In contrast, depressions are contained and moderated when bounded rationality is assumed. Second, when the economy is in the zero lower bound forever the Taylor rule 1 e.g. Clarida et al. (1999) , Gali (2008 Gali ( , 2015 , .
is violated and the equilibrium is indeterminate (from one period to another economy jump randomly to dierent equilibrium). Such theoretical result has not been observed in the aftermath of the crisis of 2008. In this regard, the new model contributes to avoid this strong result of multiple equilibria. Third, Cochrane (2016) has pointed out that in the traditional New
Keynesian model a rise of interest rate may lead to a rise in ination (an equilibrium among others, due to the multiple equilibria problem). However, the behavioral model helps to overturn this striking result 2 .
Moreover, the rationale for adopting this behavioral New Keynesian model to study the optimal monetary policy lies in the critiques that have been addressed to the traditional model, its underlying assumptions and its policy implications. As has been pointed out by Stiglitz (2010) , one important underlying assumption of the traditional model is the rational behavior of the economy, but the economy seems inconsistent with any model of rationality.
Such criticism has been carried out by the behavioral New Keynesian model which is assuming partially myopic agents which is leading to relax the assumption of rationality. In addition, Stiglitz criticized even more the policy prescriptions that arise from the traditional model. Such criticism will be 2 For more problems that has been resolved by this behavioral approach see Gabaix (2016) .
carried out through this paper.
Looking at the number of questions that has been addressed with the behavioral New Keynesian model and the results that have been found, I expect to be interesting to study the optimality of monetary policy within this new framework, in order to come out with some results that reconcile between the theory of optimal monetary policy and the practice of the central banks.
Indeed, the literature on the optimal monetary policy largely gives the credit to commitment 3 in setting an optimal policy while the discretion is seen as Clarida et al. (1999) the practice and the theory of optimal monetary policy.
The present paper proposes to study the optimality of monetary policy within Behavioral New Keynesian model with bounded rational agents proposed in Gabaix (2016) . Within a wide range of central banking literature, two methods have been used. The rst one is the linear quadratic problem used by Clarida et al. (1999) and Gali (2008 Gali ( , 2015 . In this approach the central bank seeks to choose a path for ination and output gap that minimize a quadratic loss function. The second approach is that of welfare-based utility maximization by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) . However, connection can be established between utility maximization and linear-quadratic policy problems of the sort 5 . One possible limitation of this approach is that, while the widely used representative agent approach may be a micro founded method to study the behavior of the economy, it could be highly misleading methodology for studying welfare. As illustrated in Clarida et al. (1999) , if some groups suer more in recessions than others and there are incomplete insurance and credit markets, then the utility of a hypothetical representative agent might not provide an accurate barometer of cyclical uctuations in welfare. That's why literature takes a pragmatic approach to this issue 5 I refer here to the Chapter of for a formal presentation of the link between the two methods.
by simply assuming that the objective of monetary policy is to minimize the squared deviations of output and ination from their respective target levels.
In this paper, I work with the rst approach of linear quadratic deviations to study the optimal monetary policy within the behavioral New Keynesian model of Gabaix (2016) . The remainder of the paper is the following. The second section will be dedicated to a brief presentation of the behavioral New
Keynesian model and a comparison with the basic one. Section three will study the optimal monetary policy under discretion and the forth section will take up the same question under commitment. A nal section will discuss the main results.
2 Behavioral New Keynesian Model: Remainder and
Comparison
The model that will be used is based on Gabaix (2016a and 2016b ). This framework is based on the psychological foundation of Bounded Rationality, so the assumption of rational expectations hypothesis is relaxed. In this approach, agents build a simplied model of the world. The representation crated will be sparse, in the sense that agents will pay attention to just a few parameters in order to make an economic decision. This will lead to a modied New Keynesian model. 
This function can be perceived as utility function when the consumer is partially inattentive to the vector x. Whenm i = 1, it means that the agent is fully attentive to the variable x i when making her decision. In contrast, when m i = 0 the agent is completely inattentive to x i which means that agent think this variable is not relevant for her decision.
Solving the problem of maximizing the attention-dependent function will lead to a solution of the form:
The sparse max operator will be the same as the traditional max operator, but including some vector of inattention 6 which will lead to a solution that contains the agents' inattention parameters.
Behavioral New Keynesian Model
Following Gabaix (2016b) , the behavioral IS relation is the following:
6 More developments and cases can be found in Gabaix (2014 Gabaix ( , 2016a 
When M f = 1 we recover the traditional model. The behavioral model changes simply β to βM f in order to account for some myopia about the future evolutions.
Notation and Denition y t the (log) output, y e t the ecient output and y n t is the natural output.
x t ≡ y t − y e t is the welfare relevant output gap. The relationship that links those variables:ỹ t ≡ x t + (y e t − y n t ).
By using this relation, one can easily transform the IS and Phillips curve equations in term of welfare-relevant output gap as:
With r e t = r
is the ecient interest rate perceived by households.
With u t ≡ κ(y e t − y n t ) is a cost-push shock, that evolves as an AR (1):
Optimal Monetary Policy Under Discretion
The central bank makes whatever decision is optimal each period without committing itself to any future actions. That case is often referred in the literature as optimal policy under discretion. One can observe that this scenario accords best with reality. In practice, no central bank makes any kind of commitment about its future monetary policy (except in some exceptional circumstances like the forward guidance operated after the crisis). In this respect, it seems important to study the optimal policy in this context.
Under discretion, the central bank solves the problem in sequential way.
Each period the central bank seeks to minimize:
Subject to:
coecient α x represents the weight of output gap uctuations (relative to ination) in the loss function, and is given by α x = κ where κ is the coefcient on x t in the New Keynesian Phillips curve, and is the elasticity of substitution between goods. One can interpretα x as the weight attached by the central bank to deviations of output from its ecient level in its own loss function, which does not necessarily have to coincide with the household's.
The optimality condition for the problem above is given by:
The relation (5) must be satised forever in order to minimize the loss function; it can be called the targeting rule for the central bank. In the face of inationary pressures (due to cost-push shock), the central bank must act by driving output below its ecient level. Such a policy is widely called by leaning against the wind policy, which must be the response of monetary authority until the condition is satised. Though this principle may seem obvious, it provides very simple criteria for evaluating monetary policy.
Using the condition (5) to replace for x t in (4), I obtain:
Solving forward leads to:
And for the output gap I nd:
If we take the following notation:
The expressions for ination and output gap, simply, states that central bank lets the output gap and ination deviates from their targets by a value that is proportional to the cost-push shock. However, the central bank cannot choose the values of those variables. One possible method is to set an interest rate rule that will lead to the desired values of ination and output gap. By writing the IS equation in term of those expressions, I nd:
By simplifying, I nd the optimal interest rate under discretion is:
Uniqueness of the Equilibrium
In order to assess the optimality of the policy rule (9), we have to check if the equilibrium that will be obtained is unique. Otherwise, this policy rule will be undesirable in case it leads to multiple equilibria.
If the previous rule is used to eliminate the nominal interest rate in (3), I
will have the following equations:
We can write this system in matrix form as:
Which can be represented as:
With: z t = (x t , π t ) and A = (
).
The equilibrium will be unique if and only if the eigenvalues of A are inside the unit circle.
Proposition:(Condition of uniqueness of the equilibrium)
The rule derived in the case of monetary policy under discretion yields to unique equilibrium if and only if the following condition is satised:
Under the rational expectation hypothesis in the traditional New Keynesian model: M = M f = 1, this condition will be :1+κσ < 1 which is not satised.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Within the framework that takes into account the inattention of agents, the monetary policy that seeks to act every period in order to minimize the welfare losses will be optimal under the condition derived in proposition 1.
In contrast, in the traditional model this rule of monetary policy is seen as undesirable rule because it leads to multiple equilibria phenomena (see King et al. (2003) and Gali (2008) By comparing our nding to the traditional case, borrowing solutions from Clarida et al. (1999) for the NK model and preserving my notation:
with: q = 1 α x +κ 2 −α x βρ u Some simple arithmetic shows that:
The conclusion that arises from this result is that the central bank adjusts aggressively ination and output gap in the traditional case (by the parameter q), while in the behavioral New Keynesian model the response is much smoother. In my belief, in the bounded rationality case ination and output gap depend less on the expectations, respectively by M f and M . To the extent that expectations no more inuence the actual variables, the policy that act to stabilize ination and output every period may perceived as optimal.
In order to be analytically tractable and to visualize our results in a simple way, we have to turn to some simulation results. shown by the inequality (13) the response of the central bank will be less aggressive if the agents' inattention is incorporated in the model.
7 the model used is that of Gali (2008) and the code for the simulation was provided by Johannes Pfeifer and it is available at : www.github.com 
Optimal Monetary Policy Under Commitment
The unconstrained solution
In this case, the central bank is assumed to be credible rstly, and to be able to commit to a policy plan. Monetary authority must be able to choose a path for output gap and ination (x t , π t ) ∞ t=0 over the innitely-lived horizon in order to minimize the intertemporal loss function:
Subject to the sequence of constraints:
By writing the Lagrangian and dierentiating with respect to x t and π t , it yields the optimality conditions:
With γ t 's are the Lagrangian multipliers.
The rst order conditions yields to the condition:
By iterating this condition, we obtain:
The relation (14) 
α x +κ 2 and I assume that x 0 = 0 in the starting period the economy was on equilibrium.
The stationary solution for this equation is:
Solving for the output gap, I nd:
Relations (15) and (16) Once again and to visualize more clearly the results, it is necessarily to illustrate by some simulations. As the unconstrained solution seems dicult either to implement or to completely interpret, I now turn to characterize the optimal policy in some constrained family of solutions.
The constrained solution
In this case, I accordingly consider a rule for the output gap x t that is contingent on the fundamental shock u t , in the following way:
for all t, where ω > 0 is the coecient of the feedback rule.
Combining equation (*) with the Phillips curve (2.2), in turn, implies that ination under the rule,π t , is also a linear function of the cost push shock:
Solving forward, it yields to:
This can be rewritten as:
The problem of the central bank will be to nd the optimal solution parameter ω by minimizing the welfare loss function subject to the condition
The relationship ( they dier just by the term:
Comparing the targeting rule (*) with the one obtained in the case of the traditional model as in Clarida et al. (1999) :
One can notice that, in absolute term, the response of the central bank in the case of the traditional model will be much harder than in the behavioral model in lowering the output gap.
To sum up, in this section two families of solutions under commitment were presented relaying to the behavioral New Keynesian model. The rst one is the unconstrained solution of the optimal monetary policy, which concludes that the targeting rule for the central bank is more history dependent than in the traditional case but also it includes the terms of rms myopia. Such feature in the targeting rule highlights the importance of private expectations in terms of the conducts in monetary policy. The policy recommendation that arises from this fact is to take into account the private expectations form while conducting monetary policy.The second family of solutions is the constrained one, and it sheds light about the dierences between the traditional case and the behavioral case in some simple analytical and tractable way.
Discussion
The present paper constitutes an assessment of the optimal monetary policy under discretion and commitment in a behavioral New Keynesian framework.
With the comparison of the traditional New Keynesian model, we have provided a condition on the parameters of the model when the discretionary moenaty policy can be optimal which constitutes a theoritical foundation of the practice of the central banks in the sense of deciding period-by-period the optimal response to economic development. Moreover, in the case of the policy under commitment we showed that the response of the central bank is very smooth due to persistence that arises in the targeted variables.
In one hand, our results in the case of discretion can be supported by numerous studies that take up this question under dierent angles. As Sauer (2010) noted:"Discretion gains relative to the timeless-perspective rulei.e., the short-run losses become relatively more importantif the private sector behaves less forward looking", which is satised in the behavioral New Keynesian model. Another study that supports our nding is that of Dennis (2010) , in which he shows that discretion is found to dominate timeless perspective policymaking when the price/wage Phillips curves are relatively at due to rm-specic capital (or labor).
In the other hand, commitment continues to be important for the optimality of the monetary policy as in the benchmark model. However, the targeted variables are shown to be more history-dependent in the behavioral model and since the authority commits to a history-dependent policy in the future, it is able to optimally spread the eects of shocks over several periods.
This result is in line with the most of the optimal monetary policy literature but the most important nding is that the actions of the central bank in the behavioral model are less aggressive than the traditional one.
As pointed out by Dotsey (2008) , the rationale behind preferring the commitment over discretion lies in the fact that policymakers who can commit have the ability to follow through on promised actions that they can inuence expectations in a desirable way. One can gure out that under commitment both models deliver approximately the same value of the loss function. Although, the behavioral model performs well when it comes to the case of discretionary policy. In addition, when comparing the discretion versus commitment under the same model it appears that commitment is superior to discretion in both models. However, the dierence of loss between the discretion and commitment in the behav-ioral model is much smaller than in the traditional New Keynesian model.
What policy recommendations can be drawn ? Firstly, the monetary policy under discretion can be optimal for developing, emerging and transitional economies where the policy making process is much closer to discretion rather than commitment. Such a result constitutes a theoretical foundation of the practice of lot of central banks around the world and my respond to the crticisms raised by Stiglitz (2010) . Secondly, the improvement of the monetary policy framework for these less developed central banks comes out with an important increase in welfare as had been shown by the simulations result.
